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Gynaetopia:
Feminine Genealogies of Common Law

PETER GOODRICH*

In order to make an ethics of sexual difference possible, it is necessary to retrace the ties of
feminine genealogies ... at the levels of law, religion, language, truth and wisdom . .. [l]t is
necessary to introduce into the history of reason an interpretation of the forgetting of
feminine genealogies and thereby re-establish their economy.•

Criticisms of law and of the legal profession from feminine perspectives
considerably pre-date the various phases of modern feminist movements. In
many respects, lawyers were a privileged object of feminine critique while the
law itself represented the essential reason, antagonism, and distance that
characterized the masculine domination of the polity. The correspondence of
women married to barristers of the Elizabethan Bar indicate that it was
emotionally unfortunate and domestically undesirable to attach oneself to
men of law. Lawyers, it was said, married for venal motives, namely money,
social advancement, and political influence; they were married first and
exclusively to their profession; they were mean-spirited, cavilling and much
absent; the law consumed them and left them spent, deprived of civility,
humour, and emotion. 2 A slightly later tract, In Defence of the Female Sex,
summarizes the failings of lawyers in terms of 'eager and disputative' men
whose undoubted wit and judgement was expended in 'thwarting and
opposing one another' to the effect that they became 'impatient, sour ...
morose' and incapable of conversation. The evidence explicitly offered for this
observation was the training that lawyers received at the Inns of Court, where
students led 'a recluse and monastic life, and converse little with our sex. They
want neither wit nor learning ... yet when they come into gay, though
ingenious company, are either damped and silent or unseasonably frolicsome
and free, so that they appear either dull or ridiculous'. 3
It is not the purpose of this essay to rehearse directly the perennial and
frequently barren terrain of the social incompetence, subjective estrangement
or emotional ineptitude oflawyers. Such criticism is better read against a series
• Corporation of London Professor of Law, Department of Law, Birkbeck
College, University of London, Malet Street, London WCJE 7HX, England
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of constitutional texts which not only argued the political and legal preeminence of women but also suggested the possible presence of a feminine
genealogy repressed within the ancient constitution. 4 At a popular level, the
misogyny of English law and the 'dissembling practice' of its lawyers were
countered in terms of female courts, women's law and feminine justice. The
anonymous theatrical polemic, Swetnam the Woman-Hater arraigned by
Women, places the misogynist author of a tract published in 1615, entitled The
Arraignment of Lewde, Idle, Froward and Unconstant Women, on trial before a
specially constituted women's court presided over by a 'Ladie Chiefe Justice'. 5
The sentence passed by this 'Female Court' upon the misogynist was
(ironically) that he be silenced, that is, deprived of speech, and exiled. 6 The
pseudonymous Ester Sowernam responded to the same misogynist pamphlet
by presenting a striking defence of women in the form of a genealogy of the
feminine extracted from the Bible, mythology, and other ancient histories. She
systematically listed the achievements of great women, the lineage of feminine
rulers, and the virtues of the feminine exemplified by particular women rather
than by any essential or homogeneous class character.7
The focus of the following essay will be on the popular invocation of
feminine courts, female justices, and a separate and superior law originating
from and administered by women under the feminine sign of fate or justice,
fortune or phronesis. It will be argued that such texts form part of a largely
forgotten tradition of constitutional writings which trace a feminine
genealogy of common law, an origin and a telos of legal judgment, in a lost or
future gynocratic polity. Such a genealogy traces the feminine within the
constitution and commits itself to the dissipation of the palpably coercive
unitary conception of common law:
a return to the origins of our culture reveals that it was once otherwise, that there was an
epoch when it was the woman who initiated the rites oflove. In that time, the woman was
goddess and not servant, she guarded both the carnal and the spiritual dimensions of
love. 8

Prior to analysing three legal texts as evidence of this tradition, namely, John
Fortescue's De Natura Legis Naturae (1466), John Selden's Jani Ang/orum
Facies Altera (1610), and the anonymous Lawes Resolutions of Women's
Rights (1632), 9 a brief description of the classical background of this
suppressed tradition is necessary.
SOURCES OF LAW AND STATUSES OF WOMEN IN THE ANCIENT
CONSTITUTION
While it doubtless needs little emphasis, it is as well to begin by restating in
some detail the diverse subordinate statuses of women within the various
historical domains of common law. One dimension of such an analysis is the
manner in which it illustrates forcefully the interdependence of the various
laws governing the civil and ecclesiastical polity and still implicit, if frequently
unrecognized, in contemporary law. At the level of structure or of what was
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termed 'universal law', the civil position of women was dictated by their
inferiority, their subordinate and accessory place in opposition or accession to
men. The first source, historically and conceptually, is invariably the Corpus
Juris, and there is little scope for feminist argument in the great Roman
compilation. The Digest provides an extensive though scarcely cohereqt
medley of prohibitions, incapacities, and denigrations of women as persons
a/ieni iuris, subject to another's control. 10 General statements of principle are
to be found in D.1.9.1 (Ulpian), 'greater dignity inheres in the male sex', and in
D.1.5.9. (Papinian), 'there are many points in our law in which the condition
of females is inferior to that_of males (detior est condicio feminarum quarn
masculorum)'. While it is not feasible to provide any comprehensive account of
specific disabilities, the most obvious incapicities are comprehensively
disabling. Most broadly, by D.50.17.2 (Ulpian):
women are debatted from all civil and public functions and therefore cannot be judges or
hold a magistracy or bring a lawsuit or intervene on behalf of anyone else or act as
procurators.

By D.16.1.1 it is reiterated that wotnen, like children, canttot perform any civil
functions, they cannot undertake obligations and, by D.16.2.5, women are
prohibited from acting as anyone's defertsor, concluding that 'a woman is not
allowed to act in defence either of her husband, her son or her father.' The
doctrinal logic underlying these and other incapacities stems from the obverse
of women's inferior condition, namely the potestas or power of men. All
authority in the family , including, in early Roman law, the power of life ;md
death over children, lay with the male head of the family, the paterfamilias.
The woman was, thus, either under the power of her own family or, aft~r
marriage cum manu, would become the daughter of her husband (filiae loco).
Finally, if an adult woman became independent on the death of her father or
husband, she was forced into tutelage, into having a tutor assigned. 11 By
D.1 .9.8 (Ulpian), husbands confer their dignity or status on their wives, while
by the Institutes 1.11.10, 'women cannot adopt. They do not hold family
authority even over their real children.'
The positioning of women in permanent guardianship reflects an astringent
scholastic view of feminine capability. Sex and disability are cognate with
femininity, and it is reiterated throughout the law that women cannot perform
the functions of men. 12 Weakness, vulnerability, cunning and deception,
frivolity, frailty, and shamelessness were by the time of the early Renaissance
forensic commonplaces to be expanded, on the one hand, by reference to
divine law and, on the other, by returning to the earlier scholastic sources of
the patristic tradition. With the probably apocryphal exception of the
daughter of Accursius, who is said by John Leslie to.have 'professed the Civil
law openly', 13 neither the glossatorial nor the post-glossatorial tradition on
the continent offered much by way of reform of the position of women. The
strongly anti-feminist arguments of Jean Bodin's De Republica 14 were
influential in England and typical of humanist constitutional doctrine of the
later reception. His refutation of gynocracy argued that it was 'absurd and
inconvenient' 15 for women to govern, to which he adds finally that France, by
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lucky virtue of the 'law Salique cuts the mother short and expressly forbids
that a woman should by any means succeed into any fee'. 16
Bodin's reference to Salic law was made in the context of a work which also
stated that English common law was simply a borrowing from French local
lllw. Ftam;ois Hotman, in his influential Frpnco-Gal/ia, also a~serted the
primary role of the Salic exclusion of women but interestingly added a
reference to Tac;itus to the effect that in Britain there was 'no distinction of
sexes in Government' . 17 Holman's general conclusion with regard to the state
of French law stemmed from the civil law disability of women which was
referred to 'their weakness of judgment'. In terms that would sound well in the
language of common lawyers, Antoine Hatman authored a Traite de la Loy
Sa/ique, which argued that the exclusion of women in France depended µpon
antique custom, upon unwritten lllw, upon antiquity of the greatest weight
and authority, 'as being of uncertain origin; more august and venerable for
being collected out of inviolably guarded and uninterrupted usage.' 18 The
exclusion could not be proved but could only be referred by conjecture to 'the
most ancient memory ... et sunt haec arcana imperii [and these are the
mysteries of government] which we would better reverence rather than
research.' 19 It remained to be ijrgued that this immemorial French custom was
of such age and validity as to be best considered as a part of nature 'honouring
France above all other nations in the world'. 20
In ecclesiastical, civil, and local law, the ambiguous place of women as the
vehicles of biological and cultural transmission whose sex nevertheless
overwhelmingly excluded them de iure from participation in political office,
institutional function or real property right, was clearly a significant issue. It
was recognized that all human beings passed through the maternity and
tutelage of the gynaecium and yet, despite this crucial place and pedagogy of
the feminine, civil law continued to deny it any direct association with the
polity or public sphere. The continental debate within legal doctrine indicated
both that women were a significant constitutional problem and that lawyers
could not ignore wider theological and literary debates as to the place of
women. Within French literary culture, the tradition of advocacy of feminine
causes dated back to Christine de Pisan's La Cite des Femmes, a gynaetopia
descriptive of an imaginary city universally sheltering women. Written in
1404, The City of Ladies was translated into English in 1521 and joined a wider
post-classical tradition of defences and laudatory works. 21 While the praise of
illustrious women belonged to a classical literature stemming from Plutarch's
De Mulierum Virtutibus, orators, educationalists, and ecclesiastics of the
Renaissance and the Reformation saw the place, personality, and political role
of women as a topic of immediate and threatening proportions. It was
precisely because women were politically suspect and legally of uncertain
status within the newly vernacularized jurisdictions across Europe that the
querelle des femmes, the formulaic debate as to the place, social and natural
status, education, and deportment of women emerged in law. 22
The immediate doctrinal background to Fortescue's De Natura is to be
found in the various unsystematic rules relating to the diverse legal capacities
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and functions of women in Glanvill,' Bracton, and Fleta. 23 The source of the
rules was fairly uniformly that of Roman law, and the variations occasioned
by medieval forms of homage, lordship and kingship were consonant with the ·
underlying structure of civil law. Thus, Glanvill states the law of English
inheritance as being that:
if anyone has a son and heir and also a daughter or daughters, the son succeeds to
everything . . . the general rule (being] that a woman (mulier) never shares in an inheritance
with a man. 24

The most significant legal status of women was, of course, marriage and
Glanvill states that 'legally a woman is completely in the power of her
husband', a civilian rule which is elaborated in terms of the complete loss of
the wife's power over any property, including present or future dower, with
the sole partial exception of an inheritance acquired prior to marriage. All her
property is otherwise deemed to be at the disposal of her husband for him 'to
give, alienate or sell in whatever way he pleases ... and his wife is bound to
consent to this as to all other acts of his which do not offend against God.' 2 5
Glanvill further adopts Roman law in asserting that a married woman cannot
make a will without her husband's consent, 26 and subsequently states that ifa
woman or women are left as heirs of anyone they stay in ward of their lords
and 'even if they are offull age ... they remain in ward (in custodia dominorum)
until they are married on the Lord's advice and direction'. 27
In Bracton, the first classification of persons, following Gaius, is between
slave and free. 28 The second division of persons is between male, female, and
hermaphrodite, to which it is added that 'women [feminae] differ in many
respects from men, for their position is inferior to that ofmen'. 29 Bracton is
dependent upon Roman law in his depiction of women and is even more direct
in asserting the inferiority of their status. Women are not simply in the power
of others, in the wardship or tutelage of lords: 'some are under the rod (sub
virga), as wives'. 3 0 In terms of property, Bracton coins an appropriately
circular legal maxim - 'everything that is the wife's is the husband's' - for the
traditional reason that the wife does not have potestatem. 31 While many of the
more detailed rules relating to women, as that pertaining to women married to
men attainted of felony or outlawed, have a local character, 32 the more
general and exhaustive account of marital status and the incapacities that
result from the woman's loss of will, remain, and are acknowledged as civilian.
So too Bracton recognizes certain of the forms of protection that the civil law
offers women. Gifts made to concubines are to be recognized as valid and a
concubine may enfeoff her children. Gifts between husband and wife are
invalid for fear of duress or beguilement or improper cause (alias causas) such
as lust. 33 Nor may the husband commit fraud against 'the constitution of
dower' by making gifts to strangers with a view to the stranger transferring the
property to the wife during the husband's lifetime or after his death. 34 While
the common law is developed from the civil, it was not always politic to
recollect that descent and, in consequence, the status of women in municipal
law could atleast on occasion be argued. 3 5 The legal context of Fortescue's De
Natura Legis Naturae, the earliest text to be encountered in the common law
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querelle des femmes, is undoubtedly that of Roman law and of continental
custom. For all Fortescue's concern in De Laudibus Legum Angliae or in
Governance of England to assert the historical priority and the national
distinction of common law, both the method and the substantive content of
those treatises are drawn closely from the European law. 36 The context of the
discussion is the law of succession and it is largely governed by civil and
ecclesiastical rules.3 7

OF FATE, FORTUNE, JUSTICE, AND OTHER ILLUSTRIOUS
WOMEN
In the context of a legal structure so markedly geared to the restraint of female
right, it seems remarkable that there was space at all for the assertion of
contrary argument. Deprived of access to public office and defined most
usually by the 'civil death' (civi/iter mortua) of marriage, namely, by the loss of
will that accompanied the transfer of the daughter to the husband, the
representation offeminine right was necessarily a polemical activity and closer
in style to myth than to constitutional doctrine. The specific question debated
in the two books of De Natura Legis Naturae is that of succession in supreme
kingdoms:
A King, acknowledging no superior in things temporal, has a daughter and a brother. The
King dies without sons. The question is whether the Kingdom . . . descends to the
daughter, the daughter's son, or the brother. 38

A variety of answers are available to this question. By some local English law,
it was possible that the daughter inherit, the law of gavelkind allowing
succession to sons and daughters equally. 39 By Roman law, the inheritance
would pass by the male line to the king's brother, while in ecclesiastical law,
the same would hold with even more stringent prohibitions upon the
possibility of feminine office.
What is surprising about Fortescue's De Natura is that it devotes an entire
work of two books to the question of women. Taking the form of a dialogue
and latterly, in the second book, of a mock trial, the issue initially is that of
what law is to govern the debate. The resolution to this question is more
complex than is immediately apparent. All vernacular law claims antique or
immemorial status, as also it claims the benefaction of divine decree. Just as
Antoine Hotman depicted Salic law as customary practice so old as to be the
uncorrupted law of nature expressive of a pristine sacred will, 40 so Fortescue
depicts English custom as prior to and necesarily consonant with the divine
law as well as the law of nature and nations. The question of which legal forum
and which law is to decide the issue offeminine sovereignty raises questions of
theology, nature, and positive law, of written and unwritten prescription, of
regal and political dominion. No one law can resolve an issue as fundamental
as that of the constitution and being of woman but, rather, one law must be
folded into another according to the sacred hierarchy of normative orders, 'for
the Civil Laws say that the offspring is a portion of the mother's entrails'. 41
281
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The order of law begins with man's abandonment of original justice and
state of grace. This means that the origin of law is unknowable: its past
presence cap no longer be recollected, it cannot be other than the immemorial
and inconstant representation, simulacrum or vestigium of a pre-lapsarian
state. It is termed divine providence, fate, law or will, and it is the mother of
patural law: ' Law of Nature is daughter of Divine law'. 42 This Christian amor
matrfs or love of ap ineffable mother, of incertitude as the feminine source of
the descent of all law, is expressed more directly in the figure of justice herself.
The maternal line which runs from divine law to natural law, the feminine
thread upon which both laws precariously hang, is justice depicted first as
truth: 'the truth of justice (iustitiae veritas), which is capable of being revealed
by right reason', is the law of Nature. Secondly, however, the truth of justice is
termed Phronesis 'and is comely of face and lovely of aspect'. 43 The feminine
face or decor of justice is no accident. 44 In one genealogy of the iconography
of justice, the fates are daughters of the Parcae who are in turn the daughters
of necessity. Dike is similarly a feminine God.45 Fortescue provides a literal
expression of this iconography or imagery in ipdjcating at the beginning of the
second book that 'justice is also a judge', she who assigns to everyone her right,
for a judge is so named from pronoµncing judgment 'and she pronounces
judgment, since, as the laws say generally judgment is given by her; she is
indeed herself the judge of all human actions'. 46
One possible interpretation ofFortescue's use offeminine imagery is simply
to deny that it has any political or legal significance: it is, like rhetoric and like
art or plastic representation, merely decorative or accidental. The femininity
of justice is simply its materiality, its contingency and not its essence: it is as it
is represented for the reason that its representation is no more than a reminder
or ephemeral sign of its cause. Surprisingly, Fortescue argues directly to this
effect:
Nor is it any obstacle to her power that women are by law excluded from the judicial office;
for although the word justice be of the feminine gender, she herself is not a woman nor of
the female sex; for sex hath no place in virtues any more than in spirits.4 7

While this statement might appear to deny the expression of any feminine
cause or sentiment in the actual representation of judgment, it is nonetheless
the case that the femininity of the image, of the material presence and person
of positive law and of its insular forms does at least institute certain anomalies
and suggest separate orders and genders of the common law. Like Janus, the
common law has at least two faces. Like the widow's memory of her husband
depicted in the Ladies Calling, legal retrospection multiplies the images of the
past. 4s
The civil law dictates that the law (ius) takes its name from justice (justitia).
This derivation of the name oflaw instructs the lawyer through a grammatical
method which 'makes known to us some natures both of laws and other
virtues by force of etymologies'. 49 That ius takes its name from Justitia obliges
Fortescue to conjecture that:
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from the same it hath derived the origin of its generation, and is thus entitled to 1:,e
distinguished by the name of its parent ... but as the lustre from the light, the heat frciril the
fire, the gushing stream from its spring, so doth the law of nature come from justice .. .
justice begets law. so

The generation of natural law, of'Dame Nature' as source oflaw, involves a
complex principle of inner lineage, a principle of ruin or of relics. The
femininity of justice is not only the re(Sresentation of a material and so
contingent form of judgment, justice is memory as reminiscence and as
legitimacy, the memory of generation, of maternity, of the certitude of the cinly
begetting to the only begotten. Justice survives in the temporal law by means
of vestiges and similitudes. Justice is a temporal yet internal image (ymaginem)
which triggers recollection of who we are by virtue of reminding us whence we
came. The femininity of justice is the cunning of memory as reminiscence, as
the mirror of the plurality of experience; it is the reitscin of likeness, the
ultimate law which Fortescue admits can never produce a true image or pure
visibility for:
ofcreatures there be no true likenesses whereby the creature may be truly assimilated to its
Creator, no mo're than the shadow to the body, the footprint to the foot, or the image to
the real thirig, yet ih all things some likeness is discovered to their creators. 5 1

The paradox whtch confronts the common law - 'our Lady the common
law' - is thus resident irt the dual nature of the image and the two faces of
justice. The image is both memory and the recollection or relic (footprint) of
divine reasori. It is the deceptive form of experience; the fragile symptom or
sign of accident, and yet it is also the vehicle or bearer of esserice, it is ihe
footprint of God (Dei vestigia) and so, too, the only surviving sign of the
generation of law. And justice itself is paradoxically a wt>man. It is not
woman in terms of Christiari or natural law esserice, because neither spirit nor
soul have a sex; the truth is precisely the proper form of the incorporeal.
Justice is as a woman because even the law has a body, and it is in bodies that
sex exists (in corporibus est sexum). It is feminine because ifit is a question of
the application of law, a question of experience and judgement; of likenesses
and their material inscriptions, then justice requires that the law acknowledge
the ethical and contingent logic, the fluidity, of the event. Fortescue ~dmits
such.contingency as doe face of the common law but denies that such feniinine
attributes are ever anything other than secondary to the speculative logic of
law. He admits the figure of woman as an accident in the development of
common law and as a symbol that purveys a likeness oflaw but not its essence,
which is God. To adopt even a very simplified psychoanalytic reading of
Fortescue's denial of the significance of the female form of justice, it would
have' to be said that the denial, or, more properly, the neg&tiori, precisely
confirms that the plural figure of woman is inseparable from that of law.
The general tenor of the argument pursued in the second book of De Natura
is uril:emarkable. The King's daughter argues from divine law and specifically
from the judgment of Moses in the case of the daughters of Zefophehad who
were allowed to inherit the natne and estates of their father. 52 SHe fu~ther
offers a summary genealogy offemale rule, of noble and erudite women whose

a
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antiquity coincides with natural law·and whose role in the history of England
constitutes a precedent: 'did the law which permitted so many women to reign
ever exclude me therefrom?' 53 On the other side, it is argued that the law
should distinguish the right of succession to kingdoms from the right of
succession to private estates. Nature subjects the female sex (muliebri sexuz) to
the male in both social and domestic circumstance, while the civil law reflects
this subjection by excluding women from public office. More than that, the
querel/e is invoked to specify, with unnecessary or at least non-probative
detail, female characteristics of simplicity, subservience, physical inferiority,
lesser virtue, deformity, irrationality, slenderness of understanding, lack of
heat, deficiency of construction, heedlessness, timidity, fear of death, and the
proclivity to domesticity (yconomia). 54
The replications and the duplications conform, in detail and in range of
argument, to the broader querelle des femm es. What is exceptional is the scope
oflegal sources drawn upon to substantiate the disassociation of the feminine
imagery and grammatical gender of nature, justice, virtue, and law, from the
dignity or public or civil office of women. Standard arguments from the name
(virago is a diminutive of vir); from creation (man was created first); from
original sin (Eve was first tempted); and divine judgement (God sentenced Eve
to bring forth children in sorrow, and to be in the power of her husband) are all
adduced to support the morality of both laws, civil and canon, in relation to
women. The only further point that bears brief description is that from the
notion of 'ymago Dei' . It is man who is made in the image of God and after his
likeness, for the Bible states: 'faciamus hominem ad ymaginem et similitudinem
nostram.' The canon law reiterates that woman was not made in the image of
God and adds that 'the woman veils her head, because she is not the image of
God. 5 5 It would be against fate, against the nature of things and 'contrary to
the principle of Being (non esse de ratione entis)' 56 to grant women the right of
succession. Both Jaws encapsulate and formulate as rules the previously
existing and divinely ordained disability of women.
The duplication of the daughter reverses the assumptions of the replications. It is the form of the querelle to contradict in polemical fashion and the
daughter does not disappoint. Suffice it to relate that her argument hinges on a
history or antiquity which is older than that presented by the male litigants. If
divine judgment punished feminine sin by subordinating women to their
husbands, then logically and historically, women were orginally - and so by
nature and inclination - free of subordination. In the law of Nature, the male
argument is void: subjugation was a penalty and not a property of feminine
being. Secondly, subordination was the sentence of married women only. It
would be profane and against all principles of penal law to extend the
punishment to unmarried women. 5 7
The judgment itself is taken directly from patristic texts, specifically from
Augustine's Civitate Dei, and asserts an ordained or providential ontological
order iri which the original disposition of priorities or prelacies favoured the
male and subordinated the female sex. The woman ought to be subject to the
man, 'as the flesh to the spirit . .. the pre-eminence of the man over the woman
284
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seems to be [comparable] to the pre-eminence of the reasoning faculties over
sensual appetites, or of the soul over the body'. 58 Neither history nor counterexample nor evidence of feminine virtue could in any way transmute or by
length of time prescribe a woman's right to office. The inferiority of women
within the hierarchy of'proper nature' was a facet of the originary, of the state
of innocence, and so an incontestable law of nature coincident with the spirit
which preceded the generation of the sexes. What is established as a principle
of being or asserted as providence or fate is not amenable to change any more
than immemorial custom, practice time-out-of-mind or any other of the
'rubbish of antiquity' could fall either by reason or by desuetude from the
common law.

JANUS OR THE OTHER FACE OF ENGLISH LAW
The immediate subsequent history of the question of feminine status at
common law tended to revolve around specific issues and did not directly rely
upon any genuine re-opening of the querelle des femmes. The place of women
was mapped and the Janus face of common law was turned elsewhere. What is
surprising is that the place of women is raised as an issue at all, let alone that
subsequent constitutional texts should advocate their independence. Thus, for
John Perkins, A Profitable Book Treating of the Lawes of England, first
published in 1532, women are not a legal category but rather a series of
statuses spelled out in relation to specific property rights and transactions.
Thus, the married woman is compared to the monk, friar, servant or canon as
one without right and incapable of either livery or seisin. 59 A grant made by a
feme covert during the absence of her husband, 'notwithstanding the husband
were abroad or out of the country, wandering at the time of such grant ... so
that it was not known whether he were alive or dead, yet such grant is void ifhe
be living.' 60 Nor can the wife make a testament in the absence or without the
consent of the husband. The rules may be multiplied and, on occasion, Courts
of Equity would recognize certain rights in the wife who would be treated for
such purposes under the fiction that she were afeme sole, for example, with
respect to property granted specifically for her separate use or with regard to
certain devices used by the husband to enfeoffthe wife. 61 In conceptual terms,
Sir Thomas Smith in the influential De Republica Anglorum simply reasserts
the Aristotelian limitations upon the role of women and adds by way of
flourish that the civil law on the issue of succession should govern in England,
'on which consideration also we do reject women'.62 Yet, neither in Rastell's
The Exposicions of the Termes of the Lawes of Eng/ande, nor for that matter in
Cowell's The Interpreter, is woman - either mu/ier or feme or foemina - an
entry in its own right. 63 It is tempting to think that as suddenly as it appeared
at common law, the category of women would seem to have disappeared in the
literature of abridgments, form books, entries, breviaries, and rolls that made
as yet no attempt at systematic or conceptual classification. Women, however,
remained a problem at a conceptual and constitutional level.
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Confusion of orders and genders is, in many respects, the signal theme of
Jani Ang/orum Facies Altera, 64 a work which is explicitly dedicated to 'the
Reverse or Back Face of the English Janus', 65 which means the stories,
fictions, and legends of common law, 'which I offer up in sacrifice ... these
scraps and fragments of collection, relating entirely, what they are, and as far
as the present age may be supposed to be concerned in ancient stories and
customs'. 66 The two faces (facieque biformi) of English law, 'for thou canst
hardly choose but own him having two faces' ,67 are variously British and
Norman, pre- and post-conquest, native and foreign, saturnine and mercurial,
antique and contemporary, before and behind, and, finally, both male and
female. It is a law which is marked, in other words, like Janus, by ambiguity
and a certairi 1ndistinction. Where Janus was the god of doors and gates and
presided over the beginning or origin of things, the Janus of English law
similarly guarded the origin or entry into law, the indistinct, pre-institutional,
and indefinite time of customary or unwritten law. Its history, Selden argues, is
not only two-faced but also marred by neglect, by lack of regard and 'the
injury of time' such that its past and its records ai:e as close to myth as to
historical narrative. From the , remains of record and history, Selden
endeavours to describe the legal constitution of 'Pananglium, that is, All
England', 68 a realtn that in one view, that ofMarcianus, has in it thirty three
nations.69 And behind the legends of origin and of source of common law,
behind the narratives of its diverse temporal beginnings, the representation or
image of common law, its symbolic descent, is consistently portrayed as being
from a variety of feminine images and female figures, the forgotten faces of a
law which was never one.
The metaphor of prosographia, used by Fortescue and others, of a feminine
face of justice returns most forcefully in Selden. To represent the backface oi:
underside of the constitution, the institutional unconscious, myth or image,
leads to a return to the legal querelle des femmes. It leads in particular to a
tabulation of famous or illustrious women legislators, lawgivers, and
sovereigns from antiquity to contemporaneity. In the time of the laws, old
heroes went by the names of gods and in the qruidical Celtic colony of Britain,
the semnaitheia or 'venerable Goddesses' ruled. These were the goddesses of
justice, the Furies, 'also called Themis', who sat 'upon the skirts of the wicked'
and; as (by antiphrasis) the Eumenides, rewarded the good and 'such as are
blameless and faultless'. 70 They are the first judges of the Celtic common law,
the_deis matribus or mother goddesses to whom altars were inscribed and
before whose dreadful justice the populace would tremble and shake. To this
description Selden adds: 'Nor let it be any hindrance, that so splendid and so
manly a naine is taken from the weaker sex, to wit, the Goddesses.' 71 It is in
hon6ur of these goddesses of the night that the terms of the Jaw and, indeed,
the divisions of the calendar - 'the spaces or intervals of all time' - are defined
not by the number of days, but that of nights. 7 2
Asto the historical face of the common law, it was frequently female. While
Selden admits a certain 'poetick licerice arid rhetorical figure' to the preRoman stories, his own account, which starts with the druids, the severe and
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melancholic figures reported by Caesar, Strabo, and Tacitus, is even more
explicitly feministic. Taking the side of Tacitus, who reported that the
Germanic tribes held their women in almost mystical awe, Selden savages the
anti-feminine sentiments of Bodin, of the Salic lawyers, and of Aristotle
himself. Women in Britain participated in councils of war and in military
duties, indeed 'Britons were want to war under the conduct of women, and to
make no difference of sexes in places of government and command'. 7 3 In one
aspect, the argument is specific to Britain and to the regency of English queens,
particularly those most illustrious of monarchs, Boadicea and Elizabeth.
Women monarchs had often been the most successful and as Serjeant
Lodowick Lloyd, in an equally feministic passage, argued slightly earlier, 'if
men govern like women, then women should govern'. 74
Selden's view was both that women had governed and that they should
govern. In terms of the various pasts which Selden depicts, all are witness to
feminine rule. In mythology there were 'more She-Gods than He-Gods', while
'virtue herself ... is female in dress (cu/tu) and in name'. 75 Indeed, Selden
states that 'I will not declaim female excellency here: the thing speaks for itself
more than I can, and the subject is its own best orator'. What follows this
rhetorical gesture is a denuncil\ltion ofBodin's De Republica and an even more
polemical assertion that Aristotle would admit women to government
'whatever the foolish interpreters of the Politics say'. 76 Such an argument is a
commonplace drawn fairly directly from the antinomic or polarized form of
the querelle des femmes. 77 There can be no natural law prohibiting women
from government because historical counter-examples indicate that male rule,
far from being universal and unchanging, is quite frequently the historical
exception. Against Bodin, Selden thus lists the instances of matriarchy at the
level both of cultures - such as Egypt - and at that of individual monarchs such as Deborah or Artemis. 7 8 At an ontological level, he aligns women to the
other face of reason, to the virtues of 'sanctity and foresight', on the strength
of which the arguments against women can only be taken for 'mad rude
expressions ... not unfit for a professor in Bedlam College ... Virtue shuts no
door against anybody, any sex, but freely admits all'. 79
In one aspect, Selden's argument is that femininity is the other face of law,
which he links directly to mythology, to fragmentary records, to a feminine
imaginary and its figures of virtue. Elsewhere, in a study of the genealogy of
the gods, Selden depicts the plastic symbolism of justice in terms of a lefthanded goddess; blind and beautiful, pure and untouched: she was nature in
culture, wisdom in law. 80 The metaphor (prosopopoeia) of another face of law
may indeed be taken in many different senses. By analogy with Janus, the
female face of law is the face that looks back, that remembers both the
historical succession of feminine rulers but also, and more profoundly, the
experience or generation of habits and customs. To understand custom one
must look at law, but that law is never simply one. The law of custom is 'other'
to law or, more accurately, it is an other law in that it is in and through custom
that laws are 'discovered' or 'found' or 'declared' or otherwise born.
Femininity would here be the hidden face of tradition and women would be
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both the custodians of the unwritten and the symbols of its transmission.
Here, in the iconography of justice, lustitia would be blindfolded so as to
indicate that she looked with the eyes of the heart.
In another sense, the foresight which Selden attributes to femininity is a sign
of the transcendental quality oflegality itself. Foresight is connotative also of
soothsaying and divining, of the powers of the divine which belong either
within or without the law dependent upon the tasks or the purposes to which
these powers are put. 81 In a book on witchcraft addressed to Sir Edward Coke
and published in the same year as Jani Anglorum, the theologian William
Perkins ascribes an extraordinary power and materiality to the feminine
principle at work in witchcraft. For Perkins, the power of the feminine is
evident in the reality of their creations:
that witches may and do work wonders, is evidently proved ... and the wonders wrought
by them are not properly and simply miracles, but works of wonder, because they exceed
the ordinary powers and capacity of men, especially such as are ignorant of Satan's
hability, and the hidden causes in nature, whereby things are brought to pass. 82

The works of the feminine witch are not damnable for being unreal - 'they
were works truly done and effected' - but for being unfaithful, immoral or in
the service of other laws. Works of wonder, of divination and soothsaying, are
deceitful only by virtue of the 'evil end and purpose in working them, which is
to lie unto men' as to the hidden nature of their causes. 83 A law which
borrowed substantially from the Anglican conception of a dual polity could
not avoid at least confronting the power of such feminine reason, either so as
to confirm or so as to banish its art and practice. For, in the end, the principle
of reason upon which law was founded was neither male nor female. It has a
sex only in its embodiment, in its materialization, in the intuition, discrimination, memory or choice through which it becomes law for us. The reason of
judgment, of the application oflaw, is deemed the law of the second Venus, the
copulation of norm and fact, general and particular, rule and circumstance. 84
WOMEN'S LAW

In concluding his argument as to the right of women to govern, Selden stated
'nor could I forbear out of conscience with my suffrage, to assist as far as I
could, that sex, which is so great and comfortable an importance to
mankind'. 85 Here and elsewhere in Jani Anglorum Selden had challenged
aspects of the Renaissance interpretation of Aristotle and in this regard he
builds upon a political tradition that saw Elizabeth's sovereignty as an
occasion to reassert the argument for feminine office and rule. John Case, in the
Sphaera Civitatis (1588) had attacked the assumption that the domestic duties
and subjugation of women should be interpreted as extending to the public
sphere:
Experience makes her wise. What, therefore, prevents women from playing a full part in
public affairs? If one is born free , why should she obey? If one is heiress to a kingdom, why
should she not reign? 86
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At one level this argument simply recognizes female regency as historical
reality and suggests that constitutional doctrine recognize this accomplished
fact. More interesting, however, than the political assertion of a challenge to
scholasticism is the desire to develop and interpret this argument on the
strength not of the classics but of common law. Thus, in debating the more
complex issue of Mary Queen of Scots, it is John Knox, attacking the
'monstriferous empire', the enormity, vanity, odour, and 'pestiferous policies'
of this idol, this 'cursed Jezebel', who relies wholly upon Roman law and
patristic interpretations. 8 7 The apologists for women tum to the vernacular
English jurisdiction and the maternal common law.
Bishop Aylmer's response to Knox argues:
that this matter belongs not to the civil law, but to the municipal law of England, for like as
every field brings forth not all fruits: so is not ~ne law mete for all countries. I grant that the
civil law is the best, the perfectest and the largest, that ever was made: yet comprehends it
not all things in all countries ... wherefore in appointing us to be ordered by civil law you
offend in iustitia distributiva ... our law must direct us, because it best agrees with our
coun.try.88

Civil law would smother England and extinguish those customary rules that
were the distinctive inheritance of common law, its ancient stories which 'be
the witness of time, the candle of truth, the life of memory ... and the register
of antiquity'. 89 The civil law, in its universality and abstraction, in its size and ·
its strength, would destroy the feminine virtues of the local and particular
experience of common law. Like a woman, the common law is inessential and
particular when compared to its parent or its continental competitor; it has
either to mimic the stronger and prior law or differentiate itself by defining
itself against it. But whichever is the case, the memory of the rule of the parent
civil law is traumatic for a common law which seeks its own identity through
separation and polemic. For Aylmer, it is thus our 'own weights' that should
weigh in the scales of justice and by those measures women are to be more
liberally treated and their ryght to succession and office allowed.
Even more striking for its assertion of the vernacular law is the work of John
Leslie in defence of Mary Queen of Scots' claim to the English Crown. Neither
civil law nor Salic law have any place in England where the law is unwritten
and 'grounded onlie upon a common and generall custome throughe owte the
whole realme ... as apperethe by the treatise of the aunciente and famous
writter upon the lawes of the realme named Ranulphus de Glanvilla.' 90
Leslie's account of the law ostensibly builds upon a detailed knowledge of
uniquely English rules. The question of succession, concerning as it does the
royal prerogative and powers, must be decided by rules that uniquely govern
the sovereign. To this effect, he cites the 'maxime oflawe' that 'no maxime or
rule in the lawe can extende to binde the kinge or crowne, unless the same be
speciallie mentioned therein'. 91 On the strength of this principle of interpretation, Leslie admonishes those who had taken legislation of 1350, An Act
Touching such as be born beyond the Seas, as applying to the Crown, which was
not specifically named. The legislation was taken, though only by implication,
to deny the right of inheritance in England to those who were born out of
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England, out of the 'ligeance of the King' and whose parents were not 'of the
obedience of the Kinge ofEnglande'. 92 To apply such law to the Crown not
only ignored the principles of statutory interpretation but also ignored
constitutional history and the law on strangers recollected from English case
law whose records no longer survive.
The distinction and idiosyncracy of English law is a theme common to
Aylmer and to Leslie. It is thus argued comprehensively that 'by custom in
England all manner of ... jurisdictions and other prerogatives [are], and ought
to be, as fully and wholly and absolutely in the Prince female as in the male,
and so was it ever deemed, judged and accepted'.93 It is upon the particular
character and quality of such arguments that attention should be focused.
Subsequent texts which argue for female rights or simply attempt to protect or
defend the status or the interests of women are most striking where they attach
such concern to substantive legal issues. On the one hand, there are texts such
as Heale, An Apologiefor Women (1609), which endeavour to argue for change
in the law on the basis of theological and moral prescriptions. The sole topic of
the Apo/ogie is the question whether the husband has a legal right to beat his
wife: In analysing the civil law - which governs all aspects of spousals and
marriage - Heale finds many rulesthat are archaic, ignorant or simply morally
.objectionable. The catalogue of laws in need of reform includes the
dependence of the wife on the husband in terms of dignity (she takes his name
and status) and the duty of the wife to follow the husband from city to city or
even abroad. It includes the 'strict and obdurate' rule that the wife loses her
dowry for giving a 'lascivious kiss' and equally remarks the inequality that
allows the husband to commit adultery but holds that if the wife 'play the
Adulteresse ... the husband may then produce her into publike judgment,
deprive her of .her promised dowrie and expose her to perpetual divorcement'. ll 4 Nowhere, however, in civil or canon law canHeale find any 'positive
sentence or verdict that it is lawful for a husband to beat his wife'. 95 It is pure
interpretation based upon the invective of 'mysogynaes' and 'cynickes' who
have either the hate or the ignorance necessary to bend the law and to suggest
that so indecorous, immoral, and ill-mannered ·a custom could possibly be
English law. If it is, however, to be taken as law, then there is nothing to say
that the wife is legally bound to endure or tolerate such beating. She may leave
her husband and the husband must pay her an adequate maintenance during
her absence. 96
Heale argues by extensive analogy and by reason of consistency. While his
work certainly has its share of arguments drawn from the querelle - he praises
famous women, he adopts the theological argument that Eve was made of
man, but man was made of earth ('man by a strange kind of metamorphosis
[was] converted into woman' 97 ) - but the primary force of the argument is
pragmatic and legalistic and does not go further than suggesting that male and
female are equal in their qualities as in their failings. It is, for Heale, ultimately
a constitutional question and so a question of manners, decency, and decorum
in the estate of husband and wife. As decorum is the end or goal of the
Anglican commonwealth, it is the task of the lawyer:
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as a laborious traveller [to go] through all estates, to bring all unto decency. He ordcreth
the estate of monarchs and princes; of peers and nobles; of magistrates and subjects; of
parents and children; of husbands and wives; of masters and servants . .. so that an
absolute indecorum is an absolute breach of the law.9 8

Such a view may well seem to come close to the heart of the unwritten
tradition: what is against the judicial perception of good manners or is 'not
without vice' is unlawful of itself as being contra bonos mores, indelicate, odd
or extreme.
The evidence of the Repertorium Canonicum and other abridgments and
treatises would seem to suggest that in some areas doctrine does change to the
end of greater protection of the separate rights of women. The rights or
interests protected vary over time and are normally attendant upon or
secondary to male interests. Nonetheless, fictions are developed to allow the
husband to endow the wife; 99 the issue of duress in marriage is canvassed in
relation to gifts and wills made by the wife either to the husband or to strangers
to the marriage; 100 the wife is allowed a plea of non est Jae tum in relation to
debts; 101 the interest of the unmarried woman in her own reputation is
protected rigorously by laws of defamation; 102 there is legislation on rape and
the carrying away of unmarried women with property; 103 the law governing
separation and rights of alimony is further elaborated, 104 as are other rules
designed to maintain the reputation and decorum of the feminine. Decorum,
however, while it may be the oldest of legal criteria is hardly the most definite
nor necessarily the most accessible.
The greatest legal monument of the querelle is not Heale's defence nor
Selden's poetic histories but, rather, a legal manual in the style of a work of
self-help called The Lawes Resolutions of Women 's Rights, anonymously
published in 1632. 105 While the popularization of legal knowledge was a
dimension of the vernacularization which accompanied print, and many law
dictionaries, books of precedents, and treatises were prefaced with remarks to
the effect that every subject of the realm could now know the law, 106 a book
devoted to women's law and subtitled the Woman 's Lawyer is a remarkable
event. What could 'woman's law' be if the law knew no such category? The
answer is that, for the purposes of this new legal discipline, the author of the
Woman's Lawyer replaces the first division of the law of persons - that
between slave and free-with a 'a primary distribution' between masculine and
feminine, for masculum etfoeminamfecit eos. 107 Yet the category of woman
includes no single designation or definition but rather lists every transaction in
which femininity- the various categories offeme, mu/ier,foemina, dowager,
concubine, virgin or ward - was an element.
The purpose of the treatise is twofold. It is first designed simply to extract
from common law sources - from statutes, conjoining customs, cases,
opinions, sayings, arguments, judgments, and points oflearning- that part of
English law 'belonging to women', or which 'contains the immunities,
advantages, interests and duties of women'. 108 In this respect, the work is
ostensibly addressed generically to the illusory referent 'women' and is
designed to provide information 'with as little tediousness as I can' 109 which
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was not otherwise readily available. In this sense, the work is an exhaustive
catalogue of points oflaw that mention, touch or affect the different categories,
statuses or faces of the feminine. Such popular intent, however, has deeper
roots, for as Selden found in Jani Anglorum, it is not possible to write a
constitutional history, let alone list the laws that govern a majority of legal
subjects without becoming aware ofthe ambiguity or the ethical inconsistency
of the tradition. To compile an extended account of the law touching women
was to produce a document enfolded in several jurisdictions or laws and of
itself a record of peculiar cultural and political significance. The constant
theme of the advice offered throughout the treatise was that of the defence of
women, the critique of common law, and the manipulation of hostile rules to
the benefit of an oppressed class.
Wherever the law could be ameliorated or its application tempered by
foresight of feminine need, then the Woman's Lawyer offered the means of
such fiction or improvement. Heale's example of the lawful right of the
husband to beat his wife is confirmed, according to our author, by Brooke's
Abridgement, which states that 'ifa man beat an outlaw, a traitor, a pagan, his
villein, or his wife it is dispunishable, because by the law common these
persons can have no action.' 110 The reason at law for this disability is both
specific, in the form of the precedent cited, and a consequence of the general
status of the wife as sub potestate viri, and so without independent legal
personality for most though not all purposes. There is thus no obvious legal
solution to the problems of the woman whose husband is violent, either in
precedent or in doctrine. The Woman's Lawyer, however, does not limit itself
to remarking the woman's bad choice of company. A writ listed by Fitzherbert
is cited which states that:
she may sue out of Chancery to compell him to find surety of honest behaviour toward her,
and that he shall neither do nor procure to be done to her (marke I pray you) any bodily
damage, otherwise than appertains to the office of husband or lawful and reasonable
correction. 1 1 1

The English Janus gave with one hand what it took away with the other. The
Woman 's Lawyer remarks that the scope of this power of correction is
uncertain yet continues to observe that:
the sex feminine is at no very great disadvantage ... why may not the wife beat the husband
... what action can he have if she do ... the actionless woman beaten by her husband, hath
retaliation left to beat him again, if she dares. 11 2

The discussion of 'lawfulness' is concluded by remarking that if the husband
come to Chancery to compel surety he is unlikely to be heard. While this may
well have been good law, it is hard to imagine that it was good or feasible
practice in a legal context in which a wife who killed her husband was guilty of
the felony of treason, albeit petty treason against the prerogative of the
husband. 113
The advice offered in the above example would appear to be in part ironic,
yet the fact that every section of the work contains similar advice for the
woman suggests that in that instance it was more likely despair than flippancy
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that motivated the sentence. In other segments of the treatise the advice is of
obvious purport and the suggestion of fictions would genuinely change the
law. Different transactions, relationships, and threats create different
problems for the female 'persona' in law and the Woman 's Lawyer attempts no
one solution or form of exchange for distinctive situations. Thus, one chapter
of the treatise is devoted to the law on loss of dower, the wife's entitlement in
law should the husband die before her: 'the rest of the fourth book shall consist
most in warnings to widows and women tenants in particular estates, that they
do nothing prejudicial to their warrant', namely to the writ of quod ei deforciat
which allows a widow to recover dower. 114 The subsequent chapter lists the
various ways in which a widow might lose dower, as by allowing buildings or
woods to fall to waste and so threatening the interest of the reversioner; if she
alienated or made a gift of lands held in dower, the heir could recover. In
broader terms, the advice on dower is not only cautionary but hortative. The
Woman 's Lawyer remarks that divorce and widowhood should in many
respects be welcomed: 'Why mourn you so? Consider how long you have been
in subjection under the predominance of parents, of your husbands, now you
be free in liberty, and free proprii iuris at your own law' and under the power or
'controlment' of no man. 11 5
In respect of other transactions, the woman may or may not retain legal
personality according to specific rules. In some instances, the advice is trivial
or humorous. The widow who takes more apparel than is convenient for her
degree is made an executrix de son tort demesne, which is 'a troublesome
office'. 116 A wife only becomes entitled to dower upon consummation of the
marriage and so is advised to leave the wedding party early 'and leave out the
long measurles till you be in bed . .. get you there quickly, and pay the
minstrels tomorrow.' 11 7 More serious advice pertains to the presumption of
duress in relation to contracts between husband and wife, the possibility of
employing fictions to enfeoff the wife, and the circumstances under which the
crimes of the husband will be visited upon the wife, as when she loses her
dower if her husband is outlawed or attainted of felony. 11 8 The status of the
married woman is that of infant: she loses her property, is incapable of making
contracts, cannot sue or bring a writ in her own right and can neither inherit by
nor make a will. At the same time, 'in matters of criminal and capital causes, a
feme covert shall answer without her husband' unless the crime was committed
with the husband or by coercion of the husband, in which case the wife cannot
be charged. 11 9
The disabilities and incapacities as well as the rights of women are specific to
·occasions and transactions. The Woman 's Lawyer attempts to situate
particular legal relations with regard to their impact upon the female sex. The
closest that the work comes to a general account or critique of the law
governing women is in relation to the inequality of legal provision in
circumstances where difference of sex - however defined - would not appear
determinative. Thus the law governing elopement, whereby a woman forfeits
her dower for adultery but the husband is immune, and is allowed any number
of adulterous relationships without forfeiture of land. Redress for this
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inequality should be 'by Parliament' and in the meantime there was the
Christian solace of knowing that 'liberty or impunity in doing evil by
immodest life or lascivious gallops, is no freedom or happiness'. 120 In
suggesting reforms of the law or in berating aspects of specific legal conditions
such as the loss of noble status in a woman who marries below her degree, it is
not so much the unity 'woman' as the fragmentary condition which is the
object of critique. The feminine sex oflegal subjects should not be 'abstruded',
smothered, concealed or 'scattered in corners of an uncouth language', but, at
the same time, the Woman's Lawyer does not treat that sex in an undifferentiated way. 121 Thus, to take one final example, the Woman's Lawyer begins
not by defining the classification of all persons into male or female, but, rather,
by listing the seven ages that the woman has for legal purposes. The different
legal states of femininity, as maiden, wife, widow, are cross-cut by virginity
and maternity, but also by age, as, for example: 'woman is out of ward for her
body [that is, she can marry] before she is out of ward for her land'. 122 If she
marries a man under age she remains in her father's ward. She may have dower
at the age of nine, at twelve she may consent to marriage, at fourteen she may
choose a guardian. 123

GYNAETOPIA OR THE LEGAL PLACE OF THE FEMININE
The most strikingly contemporary feature of the Woman's Lawyer and, more
generally, of feminine genealogies of law is the uncertainty of the category of
women within early legal thought. In Selden's terms, the feminine was both the
other face and the particularity of common law. At one level, this ambiguity
forced law to mix with other literatures and to search the languages of
theology, nature, philosophy, medicine, politics, ethics, and the other occult
sciences to find some way of characterizing an essentially inessential being.
The feminine, however, escaped delimitation: it was both fecund and fluid,
both image and flesh, ignorant and erudite, illustrious and idolatrous, both
Iustitia and Jezebel, matter and wonder. This sex which was not one, which
was lost or 'clean abstruded' in the law was never successfully defined in
advance as the querelle des femmes would have intended. Women were not a
predicate oflaw but rather impermanent subjects oflegal judgment. A woman
was an expression of a legal event, of decisions and discretions made legible by
the conflation of legal experience and imaginary literary sentiments. Indeed,
literature here came to play the law and, to the extent that it embraced the
literary representation of femininity, it did so at times to the benefit of women:
it was through figures, presumptions, fictions, and dreams, through the
imaginary, the other, the aesthetic, through a certain novel ecriture as well as
ethical argument that legal change occurred.
Fortescue and Selden derive what may properly be described as an image of
woman from a lost genealogy or historical memory of femininity. It is also, in
terms of its representation, under the sign of Polyhimnia, 124 the femininity of
memory as reminiscence, whereby 'out..of one thing remembered others are
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discovered'. 125 Jani Anglorum maps the places of women in the repressed,
neglected or forgotten history of common law. It is possible that this narrative
of the feminine in common law, of custody or custom as creativity and of
tradition as generation, is to some large degree linked to the literary
recollection of women, to gynaetopia and its illustrious women. In the City of
Ladies it is after all Justice - defined as measure - who comes to the dreamer in
1404 and offers to people the City, the feminine commonwealth, with women
of reason, prerogative, and honour. 126 Justice is the third Lady but the chief
virtue, and she represents a juridical history of illustrious women. In the
ensuing tradition, it is not only the task of literary femininism to chart the
narrative of feminine excellence and erudition; 127 it also states the constitutional case for the right and sovereignty of women in. the varied spheres of
their political experience. In such terms Agrippa, for example, remarks that
'the English nation were most ungrateful, should they ever forget their
obligations to this sex', or allow 'unjust laws, foolish customs, and an ill-mode
of education' to continue to usurp their liberties. 128 For Agrippa, to continue
with the same example, women's proximity to generation and reproduction
granted them an ontological superiority as well as a mythological sovereignty,
for:
woman was formed miraculously ... (and) was the end, and last work of God, and
introduced into the world, not unlike a Queen into a royal palace . . . Man seemed only her
harbinger or attendant. 129

The feminine was here the telos ofnature,just as for Selden Justitia, a woman,
was the telos oflaw. 130
At one level, it might be argued that this concern with justice as feminine, as
an image and end of law, simply spells out in hyperbolic manner the formulaic
commonplaces of feminist and anti-feminist rhetorics. 131 In this sense,
feminist argument, its exaggeration, speculation, and apocryphal histories,
would simply represent the externality of the feminine to the legal: the image
which is chosen to represent the system of law, the legal totality, would
necessarily come from outside it. 132 In Fortescue's terms, the likeness oflaw is
not the law itself and there, perhaps, is one reason why in Renaissance
iconography the face of justice was blindfolded, self-consciously following a
classical tradition of mutilated representations of virtue in which justice would
not see the face of the litigants nor they the face of Iustitia. 13 3 If, as
contemporary philosophy suggests, 'the face is presence' and command, and
so neither metaphor nor figure, a feminine representation which is blindfolded
would thereby be disallowed full presence, just as a woman could not
command, except by way of exception.134 Yet the argument made is that
where law sought to be blind, the feminine face of justice looked back so as to
see. To consider further the significance of the face to law, it is necessary to
return to the querelle and to contemporary rhetorics of gesture. In generic terms:
by the outward countenance we do judge of the qualities and disposition ... the most
pliable part of virtue, is by greatest observance planted in the most proportionate
feature. 13 '
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The outward face is the 'judgment of nature', for vultus est index animi, the
countenance and the eye are the sign of the soul. Yet as Fortescue and Selden
made clear, the face is not without its ambiguities; it was neither infallible as an
index nor permanent as a sign of inward disposition. 136
The face is also sexed. The shamefacedness of women was designed to
protect men from themselves and to protect them from sin. The blindfold on
the face of justice seems plausibly to have also benefited men through the
limitation, mutilation - it could also be a bandage - or sensory deprivation of
women. The stake of such an effigy, shadow or image is never innocent. In a
secondary sense, the blindness of justice can be taken to represent the peculiar
folly of common law in its dependence upon the blind reason of precedent and
the unseeing eye of an aural or auricular tradition. In common with other
critiques of common law, particularly that contemporaneously associated
with the English civilians, 13 7 the argument would be that without some vision
of the peculiarities of parties and the particularities of circumstance and
experience, the law has no connection with reality but simply and stupidly
repeats past judgments as if they were both reason and law. Such repetition of
judgment stipulates the present instance as a predicate of the past instance,
without reason, foresight or ethics. The Woman 's Lawyer challenged that
predication and in constructing the law as it related to the various aspects of
women, suggested that it is through the specific character, experience, and
reason ofjudgment, through what the ancients termed synderesis, 138 that legal
personality is formed and the plurality of faces of women are distributed
through the institutions and relations that constitute the social world for us.
Finally, if such baroque retrospection multiplies our images of woman at
law, it does so perhaps by holding to her face a broken mirror - the very
emblem of distortive retrospection. But it would be wrong to suppose that the
truth of history is not also the effect of accident or crisis, that the many faces of
the common law itself do not reflect its ambiguous relation to its past. The
common law had no single identity: its polity was plurality and its history
Janus-faced. In breaking away from Rome and the civilian tradition, the
common lawyers were forced to invent a unitary national law, to find a
representation which would bind together its disparate legal practices. The
solution, in the form of an image, was that of a local and particular tradition of
precedent, based upon a law that was /esbia regula or pliable rule, 139 drawing
upon the infinite uses of experience and a custom conceived as connatural to
the people. 140 To represent the separate and local features of the common law
required the most misogynist of doctrinal writers to emphasize the distinctive
and particular character of common law in terms of what would both then and
now be perceived as feminine characteristics. The crises of the national law
forced it to abandon the paternal regulae or rules of Rome, to represent
instead the fecundity, the antique douceur of common law, to show the second
face of the English Janus, namely, that of women: either Fate or Justice,
Fortune, Nature, Prudence or Phronesis as occasion might demand.
The emblem of the feminine or, at least, the attribution of female
characteristics allowed the reassertion or even the apparent rescue of common
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law from the harsh or, at least, foreign imposition of the civilian tradition.
Humanism consistently argued by reference to the 'great Ladie of Learning ...
true Philologie' and through her referred to even earlier, older or more pristine
textual sources. 141 It was implicit in the philological form of humanistic
argument both that the most ancient_source was the true source but also that
time and diligence would constantly uncover new antiquities. In short, just as
common law was shown to precede Roman law, so other insular laws were
shown to antedate the common law. Prior to Edward the Confessor's
unification of the kingdoms of Albion into one common law, the philologist
could discover several other laws, the regencies both of feminine monarchs
and before them of venerable goddesses. The priority of antiquity forced the
possibility of feminine governance upon the common law, if only as its other
face or exceptional past. These were the stories, the feminine genealogies of the
greatest antiquity, ofan original age of women: 'that is truth which is first, that
is adulterous which comes after' .142 It is not surprising in this context that
certain common lawyers even went so far as to suggest the recognition of
feminine difference in the positive form of political suffrage, and civil and
domestic rights. Insofar as elements of common law changed, it is not
incorrect to say that legal events altered the 'relative or civil' definitions of
women. 143 It is also plain that such civil definitions of feminine status were
relative to male governance and relative further to the loss or repression of the
feminine genealogies which renaissance lawyers had briefly recollected. To
understand that failure, loss or forgetting of a specific history and its texts, it is
necessary to return again to the question of difference.

CONCLUSION: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DIFFERENCE
The simultaneous praise and denigration or assimilation of the feminine is
traditionally played out over a series of ambiguous and often antagonistic
metaphors. Women, in the theological language which underpinned the
ecclesiastical law, were images, surfaces or screens that lacked substance and
depth.The feminine was empty and dissimulated or hid its emptiness through
'sophistic reasoning and carnal pretence' . 144 More than that, the feminine
transgressed the orders of nature and, like the plastic image, polluted the spirit
by confusing it with sense. In one respect, this reference to sense was a mark of
the contingency under which the feminine travelled. Contingency implied
both the realm of the inessential, of the aesthetic, the floral, 145 the inconstant,
the gustatory, ornamental, and emotive, but also, by virtue of the particularity
of the contingent, the feminine had symbolized justice, the law of the event and
of the parties to dispute. In this latter aspect, the feminine was a sign of
contingencia or touch, of a materiality, historicity, locality or relation which
theology and ecclesiatical law often labelled unclean or polluted, of sense and
flesh and earthly pleasure (erato) . 146 The belief that 'the feminine power
prevailed in Heaven' was even listed in the Repertorium Canonicum as the
heresy of the Sethiani. 147
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Women, by having no fixed value, by virtue of their uncertainty and
ephemerality as also by virtue of their worldliness or reproductive force, were
a threat not simply to the temporal order of political sovereignty but also to
the logic of common law. This had inherited both Roman and ecclesiastical
conceptions of universalia and with them, the notion of lawful meaning as a
transcendent or spiritual property of eternal decrees and the reign of a reason
that moved from like to like within the inexorable realm of the same. 148 The
belief in contingent values and in the arbitrary temporal power of fortune and
fate, were pre-Christian elements of a Stoic philosophy which natural law had
specifically replaced. 'Experience', in the words of one influential lawyer
'which is wholly gained by the observation of particular things is slow, blind,
doubtful, and deceivable, and truly called the mistress of fools' . 149 This
mistress has an ambivalent and charged position in common law. As
Fortescue had earlier remarked it was experience - induction - which 'by the
assistance of the senses and the memory' discovered law. 1so It was the
vernacular experience of the /eges terrae which the common law judges had to
apply and which differentiated common law from civil law, England from
Rome. 151 The common law had to assert a certain femininity , a reliance at
least upon the mistress of experience, to identify itself as a separate form of
law. Common law was like a woman but likeness was not essence, similarity
was not identity and so experience remained a medium but not a source oflaw.
To experience, which is characterized doctrinally as a feminine vice and
opposed to the speculations, regu/ae, and maxims 152 of the universal law,
might be added contingency and·materiality as such. The vice of femininity
was precisely its nature, its plurality, both its diversity and its ability to
reproduce, both its inconstancy over time and its production of difference. 153
As one study has recently detailed, the category of the feminine in law was not
simply plural but its attributes would change with time and historical
circumstance. The virtues of the feminine might later be the attributes of the
masculine, the value of contingency might latterly be the criterion of reason or
the source of law, for nothing was certain in the realm of experience nor was
anything constant where a feminine reason threatened to play the role of
law.1s4
The argument traced through the texts suggests that there was no singular
category of woman and as Sir Robert Filmer argued of the law in a rather
different context, 'there is great difficulty in discovering, what or who a
[woman] is'. 155 The plurality of concepts and usages of 'woman' range from
the female as an image or, worse, an idol in puritanical legal thought, the
bearer of diabolical powers, soothsayer and magician, to the praise of
illustrious women, female gods, muses and lawmakers whose soul and reason
are indistinguishable from or superior to that of men. 156 There is no common
essence to the various categories of women nor, indeed, is there any common
definition of women in law. 15 7 The 'feme sole' may share certain attributes of
the married woman or 'feme covert'. The concubine may be granted certain
aspects of the legal recognition of the wife. Unmarried women may in certain
respects resemble the dowager lady. But the differences between statuses,
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between having a will and the civil death of marriage, between being sui iuris
and a/ieni iuris, namely, between being in the potestas or power of the
husband, or of the father and having independent status at common law,
between the figure of women as indigni in the ecclesiastical law of succession,
the detior conditio of civil law and the exclusion of women from office in Salic
law, are too great to allow for the construction of any single concept of the
feminine. For the purposes of the ecclesiastical law on witchcraft, it should be
noted, finally, that even the civil law test of gender, as adopted by Bracton
from the Digest 158 to distinguish the sex of the hermaphrodite, was
inapplicable in that it was precisely the power of the witch to work wonders
(mirum), to deceive the eye and so to appear in the form of the dead or the
masculine or animals that constituted both an office and a proof of being a
witch. 159
The latter example indicates both the power and threat constituted by
femininity and its difference. To recollect the texts offeminine genealogies is to
recollect an order of difference, a separate terrain and time offeminine kinship
and regency approximating in myth or historical narrative to early law~ In
terms of legal history, the speech or mythology .of female deities and women
lawgivers had the status either of fabulous (and idolatrous) tales Qr, in
Heywood's words, they were 'a fantasme, or an apprehension of an imaginarie
thing' whose essence could not lawfully be sought. 160 The negative
connotations of difference linked the mythology of feminine genealogies to
inconsequence or to heresy within the normative gaze of a common law that
owed much to its ecclesiastical derivations. Under the category of difference
were listed all the figures of exclusion, while the place of feminine difference
was aligned with the gynaeceum, with the private, with the infantile, with
impermanence and fantasy . 161 It remains to be argued that returning, as this
paper has endeavoured, to the mythologies of femininity in the ancient
customs of common law may yet prove to be an important resource for
feminist critiques of common law.
For early feminine critiques of law, the difference of the feminine was a
powerful argument for a separate and positive status and law for w'omen. The
City of Ladies proposed a literal gynaetopia, a castle (for tuna) or a community
of virtuous women kept separate from the world of men so as to pursue their
virtue and their talents, to read, to learn, and to educate in female
commonality free from the demands and the degradations imposed by the
medieval world. In A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Mary Astell later makes a
similar suggestion. The proposal was to establish institutions for women,
similar to religious houses, in which women could retreat from the world to a
discipline, education, community, and charity of their own. The purpose of
this gynaetopia was also political. It aimed to 'amend the present and improve
the future age' . 162 The regime of the community was again to be scholarly and
studious: it would endeavour through learning to expel the 'cloud of ignorance
which custom has involved us in . . . that the souls of women may no longer be
the only unadorned and neglected things'. 163 The proposal thus aimed to
establish the value and the worth of women, to promote a philosophy of the
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feminine as well as a society dedicated to the furtherance of the education of its
own sex. The regime of this collectivity was to reflect a society 'whose soul is
love' and whose kinship was friendship .164 In a practical and political manner,
the proposals of gynaetopias suggest a species of return to what Irigaray terms
the forgotten feminine genealogies or 'to certain ancient but very advanced
traditions in which it was the women who inititiated the men into love' and
into the relationships and subjectivities, the politics and the civilities of
eros.16s

In a series of recent texts, contemporary feminists have suggested a return to
the politics of difference. At one level the argument has been that it is essential
to recognize and give space both to feminine difference and to the differences
within the feminine. Thus, legal feminists have taken up the cause of a right to
subjectivity, to care, and to relationship which emerged from a psychological
study of the 'different voice' of the feminine. 166 In a more sophisticated vein,
feminist jurisprudence has asserted the need to allow a rhetoric or writing of
the feminine, a speech authentic to feminine differences and so also a series of
rights and legal protections for the sphere, space, time or speech of
femininity. 167 Utilizing the much frequented Sophoclean tragedy of
Antigone, an argument is made for an 'other' law of the feminine which
respects both nature and spirit, ecology and divinity, 'for in that time of
feminine legal right, civil order was tied to respect for the gods and the civil and
religious powers were not yet dissociated.' 168 The recourse to tragedy, to the
dramatic representation of myth, is in effect a recourse to a series of political
demands for respect for and guarantees of difference. In place of the demand
for equality or for the legal right to be the same, Irigaray, for example, argues
for an urgent and simple series of juridical reforms designed to establish a
sphere of objective legal protections for feminine difference, namely, for a
separate legally protected identity and full civic personality for the feminine
and for the plurality which the feminine represents. The domains of sexually
engendered identities and rights would reconstitute the law of persons
according to a primary difference, that of sex:
Out of fidelity to sexual liberation and to the changes in the political horizon which it
provoked, and further to permit a cultural cohabitation between the sexes, it is necessary
to endow both women and men with rights corresponding to their respective needs. 169

The legal right to difference, to a juridically protected sphere of autonomous
feminine differences, would require a considerable re-writing both of law and
of legal method. In an immediate sense, the right to a separate legally
guaranteed civil identity ranges from protection of the physical, moral, and
imagistic personalities of women, to genuine maternity rights free of
economic, ideological (conjugal) or insititutional constraints, and a right to a
culture, to languages, religions, arts, and sciences appropriate to the
autonomy of feminine identities. 170 In a broader sense, it is argued that civil
law needs to be reformed so as to take account of the participation of two
autonomous persons, two sexes, two genres, in love as also in the other
relations of private and public life. 1 71 Essential to this transformation is a
recognition of rights of speech, a recognition of the other as an irreducible
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source of meaning, a recognition which would entail a certain respect for the
mythologies, the languages, the figures, and the fictions of feminine
genealogies. What is disclosed in this move to a jurisprudence of difference is
the direct significance of law in the reconstruction of sexual ethics. It is the
curious dialectic of this essay to suggest that the identity of the feminine and
the 'objective rights and laws' which are to guarantee its autonomy are also the
sites of the disappearance of any singular identity or unitary essence of the
feminine. What is left, at least in theory, is the right and speech of women
identified with a lineage or genealogy oflaw and of meaning transmitted from
mother to child as well as from father to son. In this context the forgotten
history of feminine genealogies and of various gynaetopias can offer a juridical
narrative of the feminine genre and a language of difference as a practical sign
of reciprocal right. Without embarking upon details of legal substance, the
model of one law faced by or in juxtaposition with another is one of the oldest
and most interesting of the histories of common law. One law on the other was
the history of utrumque ius, the relation of the ecclesiastical to the 'profane'
jurisdictions and of the spiritual to the secular laws. At various points in the
history of the relation between jurisdictions, the same civil transaction, for
example, would be tried before both spiritual and secular courts, either pro
laesionefidei or upon a temporal contract, and would be decided according to
two separate laws, according to faith and corporal penance, and according to
profane law and its monetary compensations. 172 There is no reason, either in
history or in doctrine, why different laws cannot govern different genres,
separate statuses or the plural identities of legal persons.
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71 Selden, op. cit., n. 9, at p. 5.
72 id., at p. 6. (As, fo~ example, in 'fortnight'). The gender of night, of course, has many further
significant conno~ations, some of which can be pursued in Juliana Schiesari, The Gendering of
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male and female, but prudence, the feminine quality of prudentia or foresight by which the
exercise of judgment is made possible, is a female art.
85 Selden, id., at p. 21.
86 John Case, Sphaera Civitatis (1588, Oxford) at 40--1 , cited and discussed in Maclean, op. cit.,
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from a stranger or if the husband threatens harm. Sir Thomas Ridley, A View of the Civille
and Ecclesiastical/ Law (1607, 1676 ed.) at 82: 'if any man beat his wife for any other cause,
than for which he may be justly severed or divorced from her, he shall for such injury be
punished' .
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nothing but patches and rags ... '.
137 See, for a particularly. strong example, Sir Robert Wiseman, The Law of Laws, or the
Excellency of the Civil Law ( 1664, London: Royston) at pp. 38-45, discussing the failings of
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147 J. Godolphin, op. cit., n . 96, at p . 582.
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Kantorowicz, Selected Studies (1965).
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165 Irigaray, op. cit., n. I, at pp. 103-5. See also lrigaray, op. cit., n. 8, at pp. 210-12.
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(1991).
168 Irigaray, op. cit., n. I, at p. 83. For a more detailed discussion, see L. Irigaray, Ethique de la
Difference Sexuel/e (1984) 114-24.
169 Irigaray (1992], op. cit., n. 8, at p. 205.
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cultural rights and literary styles was J. Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche 's Styles (1979). In terms of
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171 lrigaray, (1992], op. cit., n. 8, at 207.
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